1
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΤΑΤΟΝ λόγον ἐπιδείκνυσθαι μέλλων, εἰ αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός· συμβουλεύσαιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς, ὅπως προθύμως προσέχητε τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.
As I am going to demonstrate a most philosophical proposition, namely, that religious reasoning is absolute master of the passions, I would willingly advise you to give the utmost heed to philosophy.
2
Καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος εἰς ἐπιστήμην παντὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς μεγίστης ἀρετῆς ἀρετῆς, λέγω δὴ φρονήσεως, περιέχει ἔπαινον·
For reason is necessary to everyone as a step to science: and more especially does it embrace the praise of prudence, the highest virtue.
3
Εἰ ἄρα τῶν σωφροσύνης κωλυτικῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς φαίνεται ἐπικρατεῖν, γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας·
If, then, reasoning appears to hold the mastery over the passions which stand in the way of temperance, such as gluttony and lust,
4
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν κυριεύειν ἀναφαίνεται, οἷον κακοηθείας· καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀνδρείας ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν, θυμοῦ τε, καὶ πόνου καὶ φόβου.
it surely also and manifestly has the rule over the affections which are contrary to justice, such as malice; and of those which are hindrances to manliness, as wrath, and pain, and fear.
5
Πῶς οὖν, ἴσως εἴποιεν ἄν τινες, εἰ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐ δεσπόζει;
How, then, is it, perhaps some may say, that reasoning, if it rule the affections, is not also master of forgetfulness and ignorance? They attempt a ridiculous argument.
6
γελοῖον ἐπιχειροῦντες λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐναντίων· καὶ τούτων, οὐχ ὥστε αὐτὰ καταλῦσαι, ἀλλʼ ὥστε αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶξαι.
For reasoning does not rule over its own affections, but over such as are contrary to justice, and manliness, and temperance, and prudence; and yet over these, so as to withstand, without destroying them.
7
Πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλλαχόθεν ἔχοιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅτι αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός.
I might prove to you, from many other considerations, that religious reasoning is sole master of the passions;
8
Πολὺ δὲ πλέον τοῦτο ἀποδείξαιμι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδραγαθείας τῶν ὑπὲρ ἀρετὴν ἀποθανόντων, Ἐλεαζάρου τε καὶ ἑπτὰ ἀδελφῶν καὶ τῆς τούτων μητρός.
but I shall prove it with the greatest force from the fortitude of Eleazar, and seven brethren, and their mother, who suffered death in defense of virtue.
9
Ἅπαντες γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν ἕως θανάτου πόνων ὑπεριδοντες, ὑπεριδόντες ἐπεδείξαντο ὅτι περικρατεῖ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός.
For all these, contemning pains even unto death, by this contempt, demonstrated that reasoning has command over the passions.
10
Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρετῶν, ἔπεστί μοι ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς καλοκᾳγαθίας ἀποθανόντας μετὰ τῆς μητρὸς ἄνδρας·
For their virtues, then, it is right that I should commend those men who died with their mother at this time in behalf of rectitude; and for their honors, I may count them happy.
11
τῶν δὲ τιμῶν μακαρίσαιμʼ ἄν· θαυμασθέντες γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ ὑπομονῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰκισαμένων, αἴτιοι κατέστησαν τοῦ καταλυθῆναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦ ἔθνους τυραννίδα, νικήσαντες τὸν τύραννον τῇ ὑπομονῇ, ὥστε διʼ αὐτῶν καθαρισθῆναι τὴν πατρίδα.
For they, winning admiration not only from men in general, but even from their persecutors, for their manliness and endurance, became the means of the destruction of the tyranny against their nation, having conquered the tyrant by their endurance, so that by them their country was purified.
12
Ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τούτου νῦν αὐτίκα δὴ λέγειν ἐξέσται, ἀρξαμένων τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ὥσπερ εἴωθα ποιεῖν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν τρέψομαι λόγον, δόξαν διδοὺς τῷ πανσόφῳ Θεῷ.
But we may now at once enter upon the question, having commenced, as is our wont, with laying down the doctrine, and so proceed to the account of these persons, giving glory to the all wise God.
13
Ζητοῦμεν δὴ τοίνυν, εἰ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός.
The question, therefore, is, whether reasoning be absolute master of the passions.
14
Διακρίνωμεν δὲ, τί ποτέ ἐστιν λογισμός; καὶ τί πάθος; καὶ πόσαι παθῶν ἰδέαι; καὶ εἰ πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ τούτων ὁ λογισμός;
Let us determine, then, What is reasoning? and what passion? and how many forms of the passions? and whether reasoning bears sway over all of these?
15
Λογισμὸς μὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν νοῦς μετὰ ὀρθοῦς βίου· πρωτιμῶν τὸν σοφίας λόγον.
Reasoning is, then, intellect accompanied by a life of rectitude, putting foremost the consideration of wisdom.
16
Σοφία δὴ τοὶνυν ἐστὶν γνῶσις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων.
And wisdom is a knowledge of divine and human things, and of their causes.
17
Αὕτη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἠ τοῦ νόμου παιδσεία· διʼ ἧς τὰ θεῖα σεμνῶς, καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα συμφερόντως μανθάνομεν.
And this is contained in the education of the law; by means of which we learn divine things reverently, and human things profitably.
18
Τῆς δὲ σοφίας ἰδέαι καθεστᾶσιν, φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεια καὶ σωφροσύνη.
And the forms of wisdom are prudence, and justice, and manliness, and temperance.
19
Κυριωτάτη πάντων ἡ φρόνησις· ἐξ ἧς δὴ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπικρατεῖ.
The leading one of these is prudence; by whose means, indeed, it is that reasoning bears rule over the passions.
20
Παθῶν δὲ φύσεις εἰσὶν αἱ περιεκτικώταται δύο, ἡδονή τε καὶ πόνος· τούτων δὲ ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πέφυκεν.
Of the passions, pleasure and pain are the two most comprehensive; and they also by nature refer to the soul.
21
Πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον παθῶν εἰσὶν ἀκολουθίαι.
And there are many attendant affections surrounding pleasure and pain.
22
Πρὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία· μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν, χαρά.
Before pleasure is lust; and after pleasure, joy.
23
Πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πόνου ἐστὶν φόβος· μετὰ δὲ τὸν πόνον, λύπη.
And before pain is fear; and after pain, sorrow.
24
Θυμὸς δὲ κοινὸν πάθος ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνου, ἐὰν ἐννοηθῇ τις ὃτε αὐτῷ περιέπεσεν.
Wrath is an affection, common to pleasure and to pain, if anyone will pay attention when it comes upon him.
25
Ἐν δὲ τῇ ἡδονῇ ἐστιν καὶ ἡ κακοήθης διάθεσις, πολυτροπωτάτη πάντων τῶν παθῶν οὖσα.
And there exists in pleasure a malicious disposition, which is the most multiform of all the affections.
26
Κατὰ μὲν ψυχῆς ἀλαζονεία, καὶ φιλαργυρία, καὶ φιλοδοξία, καὶ φιλονεικία, ἀπιστία καὶ βασκανία·
In the soul it is arrogance, and love of money, and vaingloriousness, and contention, and faithlessness, and the evil eye.
27
κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα, παντοφαγία, καὶ λαιμαργία, καὶ νομοφαγία.
In the body it is greediness and gormandizing, and solitary gluttony.
28
Καθάπερ οὖν δυοῖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φυτῶν ὄντων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ πὸνου, πολλαὶ τούτων τῶν παθῶν εἰσιν παραφυάδες.
As pleasure and pain are, therefore, two growths of the body and the soul, so there are many offshoots of these passions.
29
Ὧν ἕκαστος ὁ πανγέωργος λογισμὸς περικαθαίρων τε καὶ ἀποκνίζων, καὶ περιπλέκων, καὶ ἐπάρδων, καὶ πάντα τρόπον μεταχέων, ἐξημεροῖ τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ὕλας.
And reasoning, the universal husbandman, purging, and pruning these severally, and binding round, and watering, and transplanting, in every way improves the materials of the morals and affections.
30
Ὁ γὰρ λογισμὸς τῶν μὲν ἀρετῶν ἐστιν ἡγεμῶν, τῶν δὲ παθῶν αὐτοκράτωρ. Ἐπιθεώρει γε τοίνυν πρῶτον διʼ αὐτῶν κωλυτικῶν τῆς σωφροσύνης ἔργων, ὅτι αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός.
For reasoning is the leader of the virtues, but it is the sole ruler of the passions. Observe then first, through the very things which stand in the way of temperance, that reasoning is absolute ruler of the passions.
31
Σωφροσύνη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐπικράτεια τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.
Now temperance consists of a command over the lusts.
32
Τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ψυχικαὶ, αἱ δὲ σωματικαί· καὶ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπικρατεῖν φαίνεται.
But of the lusts, some belong to the soul, others to the body: and over each of these classes the reasoning appears to bear sway.
33
Ἐπεὶ πόθεν κινούμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἀπειρημένας τοοφὰς, ἀποτρεπόμεθα τὰς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἡδονάς; οὐχ ὅτι δύναται τῶν ὀρὲξεων ἐπικρατεῖν ὁ λογισμός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι.
For whence is it, otherwise, that when urged on to forbidden meats, we reject the gratification which would ensue from them? Is it not because reasoning is able to command the appetites? I believe so.
34
Τοιγαροῦν ἐνύδρων ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ὀρνέων καὶ τετραπόδων, παντοίων βρωμάτων τὼν ἀπηγορευμένων ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀπεχόμεθα διὰ τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἐπικράτειαν.
Hence it is, then, that when lusting after water animals and birds, and four-footed beasts, and all kinds of food which are forbidden us by the law, we withhold ourselves through the mastery of reasoning.
35
Ἀντέχεται γὰρ τὰ τῶν ὀρέξεων πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος νοὸς ἀνακαμπτόμενα· καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται πάντα τὰ τοῦ σώματος κινήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ.
For the affections of our appetites are resisted by the temperate understanding, and bent back again, and all the impulses of the body are reined in by reasoning.